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Spatial scale and the geographical polarization of the American 
electorate 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In the large literature on the growing polarization of the American electorate and 
its representatives relatively little attention is paid to the spatial polarization of voters for the 
two parties at presidential elections. Bishop argued this has increased as the result of 
residential location decisions: Democratic Party supporters have increasingly moved to 
neighborhoods where others of that persuasion are already congregated, for example. His 
analyses at the county scale are geographically incommensurate with that argument, 
however; the lacuna is filled using precinct-level data for the entire United States for the 
2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. Multilevel modelling shows polarization at those 
elections was significantly greater at the precinct than the county, state and division scales. 
Change over the three elections at the precinct scale was probably associated with 
redistricting and reduced support from the Democratic Party by some groups. 
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America is polarized. Our political parties are highly polarized and the American electorate is 
highly polarized. … Political divisions in American politics are now deep and real. (Campbell, 
2016, 1) 
 
 
Campbell’s introductory statement to his Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America 
summarizes a substantial body of recent scholarship focusing on changes over recent decades (for 
example, Levendusky, 2009). One feature of Campbell’s book, however, and of the large literature 
on which he draws, is that it almost entirely ignores one aspect of the contemporary trend – 
geographical polarization. His chapters on the empirical evidence sustaining his and others’ central 
claims cover ideological orientations, issue preferences, and behavioural patterns but say nothing 
about the changing spatial patterning of the American electorate.  
 
There is, however, considerable evidence that the American electorate has also become 
spatially more polarized in recent decades, with many areas becoming increasingly dominated – if 
not predominated – by one of the two main parties, notably at the state and county scales (Brunn et 
al., 2008; Morrill et al., 2011; Archer et al., 2014; Watrel et al., 2018). Several possible reasons for 
such polarization have been explored (initially by electoral geographers in Cox’s, 1969, classic paper 
and followed up in his empirical studies: Johnston and Pattie, 2012.). They include (Johnston and 
Pattie, 2006): the classic neighbourhood effect, whereby social interaction within an area sees the 
dominant group there win over converts to its political attitudes and voting preferences; the 
development of a local political ethos that sustains one party much more than another; the intensity 
of activity by political parties aimed at mobilizing support and achieving high turnout of their 
supporters are elections; and migrant self-selection, whereby individuals and households with 
particular political persuasions and voting preferences choose to move to areas where similar people 
already live. All four may interact within an area as, for example, parties seek to realise the potential 
returns from changing local demographic structures. 
 
Of those processes, considerable recent attention has been given to the role of migration in 
the geographic sorting of the American electorate with, for example, Cho et al. (2013) identifying 
relocation patterns that illustrate not only geographic sorting according to neighbourhood 
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characteristics but also the importance of local partisanship as determinants of some movers’ 
chosen destinations – even in situations where that partisanship is not known but various clues 
suggest its nature (Gimpel and Hui, 2015). 
 
The role of migration as a contributing clause to geographical polarization was brought to 
wider attention by Bishop (2009) whose book’s subtitle – Why the Clustering of Like-Minded 
Americans is Tearing Us Apart – linked the ideological and behavioural polarization explicated by 
Campbell and others with an increased spatial segregation of the main groups in the electorate with 
similar opinions. Republican Party supporters, he argued, are increasingly clustering in places where 
Republican voters dominate, whereas Democratic Party supporters are increasingly congregating 
where its voters dominate the local electorate. Bishop’s account, which is mainly anecdotal and 
journalistic in tone although he claims that work by his collaborator, Robert Cushing, a retired 
professor of sociology, used all of the ‘several ways to measure segregation’ (Bishop, 2009, 9) to 
demonstrate increased polarization at the county scale, may, as Cho et al. (2013, 857) express it, be 
‘sensationalized, it is also believable enough to cause one to take pause … [and] suggestive of a 
highly compelling story’ that critiques (such as Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Abrams and Fiorina, 2012) 
have not gainsaid. 
 
Bishop’s argument contains two main hypotheses: that geographical polarization of the 
American electorate, as illustrated by voting patterns at presidential elections, has increased over 
recent decades; and that this polarization has resulted from selective migration patterns. However, 
as Cho et al. (2013) note, his empirical study of that polarization, designed to test the first of the two 
hypotheses, was undertaken at the wrong spatial scale. Like other studies of polarization, the 
smallest spatial unit deployed in the analyses is the county (for example, Lang and Pearson-
Merkowitz, 2015; Morrill and Webster, 2015; Scala et al., 2015), and yet Bishop’s (2009, 40) 
argument regarding selective migration, of people with similar backgrounds and characteristics 
increasingly clustering together, was that: 
The country may be more diverse than ever coast to coast. But look around: our own streets 
are filled with people who live alike, think alike, and vote alike. This social transformation 
didn’t happen by accident. We have built a country where everyone can choose the 
neighborhood (and church and news shows) most compatible with his or her lifestyle and 
beliefs. And we are living with the consequences of this segregation by way of life: pockets 
of like-minded citizens that have become so identically inbred that we don’t know, can’t 
understand and can barely conceive of “those people” who live just a few miles away. 
The spatial scale that he is addressing – of streets, neighborhoods and people who live ‘just a few 
miles away’ – is smaller than that of the units analysed, counties, some of which have populations in 
the millions. He established, as have other studies (e.g. Johnston et al., 2016), that polarization is 
taking place, but not at the scale at which most people and households make their specific 
residential location decisions – the neighborhood. 
 
His metric ????? 
 
Firmer tests of his hypotheses therefore require analyses at smaller spatial scales than that 
of the county. Some case studies – such as Kinsella et al. (2015), Myers (2013) and Sussell (2013) – 
have identified polarization at the neighborhood level, and McKee concluded (2008, 106) that: 
Recent scholarship indicates that as Americans have become more mobile they have 
consciously chosen to relocate into communities with politically like-minded neighbours. … 
This kind of residential sorting reinforces political similarities within communities and as a 
result accentuates political differences across different communities 
and others (e.g. Cho et al., 2013; Gimpel and Hui, 2015; Hood and McKee, 2010) have linked such 
polarization to migrant movements. But, largely reflecting the absence of data portraying voting 
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patterns at that scale for the country as a whole, there have been no studies establishing the 
intensity of polarization at the sub-county scale across the United States, let alone whether this has 
increased at recent elections. Using a recently-developed multi-scale measure of spatial polarization, 
this paper provides a first assessment of that local-scale polarization. 
 
Hypothesis and data 
 
As noted above, there are two hypotheses – that the American electorate has become 
geographically more polarized at the neighbourhood scale, and that this has been brought about by 
selective migration. If the first is falsified, then the second falls, so the goal here is to establish the 
veracity of the polarization argument. To do that, a bespoke data set has been assembled giving the 
number of votes for each candidate in each voting precinct within each county within each state at 
each of the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. Given that the United States does not 
possess a central aggregating agency for precinct-level election data, and nor do many states, 
collection of precinct-level results for the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections required contacting 
the relevant electoral authorities in each state and county as needed. In most cases, state 
Secretaries of State or Election Boards provided state-wide precinct results, but several states 
required contacting each county’s electoral authority independently, namely Colorado, Indiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Kansas, Kentucky, Oregon, and West 
Virginia required county-specific contact for a minority of counties. Most electoral authorities 
provided results without charge via email or fax, but units such as Utah and many counties in 
Missouri required fees for access to their data. The Harvard Election Data Archive supplied precinct-
level results for the 2008 presidential election.1 Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for 
previous elections and longer-term trends cannot be analysed. 
 
The number of precincts varied across the three elections. There were 186,371 in 2008 
where at least one vote was cast, with a mean number of 702 votes (standard deviation 612); the 
maximum was 36,840 and the inter-quartile range 342-869. In 2012 there were 170,277 with a mean 
of 725, standard deviation 689, maximum 45,667 and an inter-quartile range of 348-886. For 2016 
there was a mean of 780 (standard deviation 745) for the 168,023 precincts; the maximum was 
44,292 and the inter-quartile range 365-957. For each precinct we calculated the percentage of the 
two-party (Republican plus Democratic) votes cast for the Democratic candidate to form the variable 
whose polarization we modelled.2 
 
Using a multilevel measure of spatial segregation/polarization a recent analysis showed that 
at each presidential election from 1992 on the geography of support for the Democratic Party’s 
candidates across the country’s nine Census divisions was more polarized at each successive election 
(Johnston et al., 2016); that within those divisions, Democratic Party support was more polarized 
across the constituent states at each successive election; and that within states, Democratic Party 
support was more polarized across the constituent counties at each successive election – with these 
latter changes being statistically highly significant. That measure of polarization – the Median Odds 
Ratio (MOR) between the modelled percentages of support for Democratic Party candidates – is 
deployed here in the first analysis of its extent at the much finer-grained spatial scale of voting 
precincts, extending that earlier study to a fourth spatial scale.  
 
                                                          
1 https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/eda/home 
2 It is, of course, possible that because of the MAUP issue the results that we obtain with this single realisation 
of a fine-scale spatial division of counties into precincts are outliers from the general pattern that might result 
from a large number of different realisations involving the same number of precincts with the same average 
population. As with a very large number of other studies using spatially-aggregated data we have to accept 
that risk while recognising that it is very unlikely. 
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 Using a bespoke data set, therefore, this paper explores the intensity of polarization at 
recent US presidential elections at a spatial scale commensurate with the processes identified by 
several authors regarding that change. Although precinct boundaries are not necessarily drawn to 
correspond with neighborhoods, nevertheless their size is consistent with the local areas within 
which the polarization is assumed to be occurring. As such, it is the first nation-wide exploration of a 
hypothesis regarding the intensity of electoral polarization at that scale. 
 
Modelling polarization 
 
A number of different ways of measuring polarization is available of which the most popular is the 
index of dissimilarity, used in Glaeser and Ward’s (2005) analysis of long-term trends in US electoral 
geography,3 but because this index confounds systematic with stochastic variation in the allocation 
of individuals to areas it tends to over-estimate the intensity of polarization/segregation, especially 
in areas with relatively small populations (Carrington and Troske, 1997). 
 
Modelling the intensity of polarization at each scale (division, state, county, precinct) at each 
of the three elections was thus undertaken using a bespoke system developed for analysing 
residential segregation at multiple scales which avoids those problems (Jones et al., 2015) and has 
been adapted for the study of the polarization of voting patterns (Johnston et al., 2016). This 
estimates the intensity of polarization at each scale, net of any polarization occurring at the larger 
scales, rather than its intensity at each scale independent of the others. This takes into account 
Duncan et al.’s (1961) observation that any measure of segregation-polarization intensity at a 
particular spatial scale necessarily incorporates that at any larger scales in which the units concerned 
are nested: a measure of polarization at the precinct scale incorporates the intensity at the county 
scale in the current context, for example; and a measure at the county scale incorporates the 
intensity at the state scale. 
 
The nature of this scale-dependence of polarization is illustrated by the ideal-type examples 
in Figure 1. Each diagram shows a state divided into six counties (bounded by the solid lines), each of 
which is divided into four precincts. The numbers are the percentage of votes cast in each precinct 
for the Democratic Party candidate at an election. In the first state – the left-hand diagram – there is 
polarization at the county scale; Democratic Party supporters are concentrated in the three counties 
in the left-hand column. But there is no polarization at the precinct scale: within each county the 
Democratic Party gets the same percentage of the votes cast in each precinct.4 Nevertheless, if a 
measure of polarization was calculated for the precincts alone it would be positive: there is 
polarization at that scale, but only because there is polarization at the larger, county, scale – within 
counties there is no polarization. In the second example (the central diagram) there is polarization at 
both scales: Democratic Party support is greater in the three counties in the left-hand column and is 
also greater in some precincts than others within each county. Finally, in the third example (the 
right-hand diagram) there is no polarization at the county scale – each of the six has the same 
percentage of Democrat supporters – but there is at the precinct scale within each county. 
 
What is needed, therefore, is a measure of polarization at each scale, net of any polarization 
at the larger scales within which the spatial units being analysed are nested – in 2008 the 186,371 
                                                          
3 Glaeser and Ward (2005) concluded that there was no long-term trend of increased polarization, but 
inspection of their results shows a clear increase from the mid-1970s on. 
4 Note that traditional analyses of polarization/segregation do not look at its intensity at each scale net of the 
scales in which it is nested, so that they would show polarization at the precinct as well as the county scale in 
this example. Duncan et al. (1961) showed that any of the traditional measures of segregation at the finer 
spatial scale would also incorporate that at the coarser scale too, hence recent work separating out the 
intensity of polarization/segregation at each scale (Jones et al., 2015). 
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precincts nested within the 3,143 counties, the 3,143 counties nested within the 51 state-
equivalents, and the 51 state-equivalents nested within the nine census divisions. This avoids 
wrongly attributing the degree of polarization to the wrong scale – to the precinct scale rather than 
the county as in the first example in Figure 1, for example. 
 
The measure used is the Median Odds Ratio (MOR), derived from a multilevel modelling of 
the variation in the distribution of Democratic candidate support across all spatial units at each of 
the four scales. The MOR values are derived from the modelled logit variances in those rates at each 
scale, and they have associated Credible Intervals (CIs) which provide empirical support for the 
parameter values: the 95% CIs are used here to convey the uncertainty associated with the 
estimated MOR values which, because they are based on a Bayesian estimation procedure, can be 
asymmetrical about those values. 
 
The MOR values can be interpreted as follows. Take a pair of precincts within a county for 
which we have the modelled observed/expected rate and calculate the ratio between the larger and 
smaller of those two rates. Repeat this many times. The MOR is the median of all those calculated 
ratios, the average difference between any pair of precinct rates within a particular county – 
averaged across all counties. An MOR of 1.0 indicates no difference, therefore; the larger the MOR 
the larger the average difference (an MOR of 1.20 indicates that across all counties on average one 
precinct selected at random would have a modelled rate 20 per cent larger than that for another 
randomly-selected precinct) and the larger the MOR the greater the polarization at that scale, net of 
other scales. Further, because they result from statistical modelling, the CIs can be used to assess 
whether one MOR is statistically different from another – whether, for example, polarization is 
greater at the county than at the precinct scale at any one date, or whether polarization at the 
precinct scale is greater at one date than at another. It is particularly important to use a model-
based procedure here as the fine-scale of the precinct data means the total vote in a precinct can be 
numerically small and standard measures of polarization are upwardly biased when this is the case 
(Carrington and Troske, 1997). 
 
The specific form of the multilevel model (Jones, 1991) used in the analysis is as follows, 
with each year analysed separately: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚  ~ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚, 𝜋𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋𝑗𝑘) =   𝛽 +  𝑔𝑚 +  𝑓𝑙𝑚 +  𝑣𝑘𝑙𝑚 +  𝑢𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚 
𝑔𝑚~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑔
2) 
𝑓𝑙𝑚~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑓
2) 
𝑣𝑗𝑘~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
𝑢𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚|𝜋𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚) =   
𝜋𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚(1 − 𝜋𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚
 
 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚 is the observed response variable, the proportion of voters in precinct j in 
county k in state l and division m that voted Democrat and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 is the denominator, the total 
number of Democrat plus Republican voters. The log of the odds of voting Democrat (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝜋𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚)) 
is modelled as a function of a fixed effect so that 𝛽 is the overall national average log-odds of voting 
Democrat. The random part of the model consists of a differential logit for each division (g) a 
differential logit for each state (f) within a division; each county (v) within the state and division; and 
each precinct (u) within a county etc. These logit differentials are assumed to come from a Normal 
distribution and are summarised by a variance term at each level so that 𝜎𝑔
2  summarises the 
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between division differences while 𝜎𝑓
2summarises the within-division between-state variation. These 
four variances are our measures of polarization – the departure from evenness at one scale net of 
the other scale and also net of stochastic variation.  
 
The stochastic variation is explicitly modelled at lowest level as a single variance term and is 
assumed to follow a Binomial distribution. In practice this model is fitted as a five-level model, the 
counties at level 3, and exactly the same set of units – the precincts – at level 1 and level 2; that is, 
each level 2 unit has exactly one level 1 unit. This views the aggregate proportions at level 2 as 
consisting of replicated binary responses for ‘individuals’ at level 1. This use of a pseudo-level is fully 
explained in Browne et al. (2005) and allows the separation of the variance into exact Binomial at 
level 1 and over-dispersion at any higher level so that the higher-level variances summarize 
differences between areas over and above those expected from stochastic variation generated by a 
varying denominator. The estimated higher-level variances are transformed to MORs by using the 
formula given in Larsen and Merlo (2005). All the models are estimated as Fully Bayesian models 
through MCMC simulation using the MLwiN software (Browne, 2017; Jones and Subramanian, 2017). 
 
Results 
 
MOR values have been obtained for each of the three elections at the four spatial scales: precinct, 
county, state and census division – the last three of which were used in the previous analyses of 
polarization over a longer time period. Using such a nested hierarchy means that the intensity of 
polarization at the precinct scale is identified net of polarization across the country’s major regions 
(as represented by the census divisions), across the states within those regions (most of which have 
become more polarized over recent decades), and across the counties (also increasingly polarized at 
recent elections). This ensures that the reported polarization at the precinct scale is not simply a 
local reflection of polarization at larger scales. 
 
The resulting MOR values with their associated CIs are shown in Table 1. Of the three scales 
analysed previously they show slightly increased polarization across the three elections at both the 
divisional and state scales. As their CIs overlap, however, those changes are not statistically 
significant, unsurprisingly so because of the relatively small number of cases, especially at the 
divisional scale. At the county scale, however, not only was polarization greater than at the two 
larger scales at each succeeding election but it also increased significantly – as indicated by the non-
overlapping credible intervals in Table 1. Between the 2008 and 2016 elections, polarization of 
Democratic Party voters between counties within states and divisions increased by some 15 per 
cent, from 1.68 to 1.93; in the average (median) state the modelled observed/expected rate for 
percentage voting Democratic varied between any randomly-selected pair of counties by 93 per 
cent. 
 
Within counties there was even greater polarization of Democratic Party voters at the 
precinct scale. With an MOR of 2.28 in 2008, polarization then was 36 per cent greater at the 
precinct than the county scale. The gap closed thereafter; slightly in 2012, when polarization was 34 
per cent greater at the precinct scale (net of polarization at the county scale), and then in 2016 it 
was only 18 per cent larger. Further, after increasing between 2008 and 2012, and significantly so, 
polarization at the precinct scale declined between 2012 and 2016, so that at the latter date it was 
not significantly different from the situation in 2008. 
 
At each of the three elections, therefore, the geography of support for the Democratic 
Party’s presidential candidates was more polarized at the county scale than at the state scale, and 
more polarized still at the precinct scale within counties. Democratic Party voters – and by 
implication, because the percentage voting for Democratic candidates was calculated from the total 
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voting either Democrat or Republican only, Republican voters – were also concentrated in particular 
precincts within particular counties within particular states. That polarization did not change much 
over the eight years except at the county scale, for which it was significantly larger in 2016 than in 
2008.  
 
Within counties there was also intense polarization across the precincts, substantially as well 
as statistically significantly greater than at the county scale. Over the three elections that 
polarization became more intense at that local scale between 2008 and 2012, but then declined 
somewhat over the next inter-election period. This change may reflect the electoral situation; 
Trump’s successful 2016 campaign for the presidency involved him winning substantial numbers of 
votes from some groups that have traditionally given strong support to Democratic Party candidates 
– such as the white working class in parts of the rust belt – and there was also lower turnout than 
usual among African-Americans, perhaps the most overwhelmingly single-partied group in American 
politics, giving strong support to the Democratic Party’s candidates in recent decades. For example, 
using Bishop’s chosen metric – a landslide if one party defeated the other by more than 20 
percentage points – 40 per cent of the country’s precincts did not return a landslide victory for 
either candidate in 2008. In 2012 that percentage fell to 35, but it increased again to 39 in 2016. As 
some voters shifted their allegiance from one party to another between 2012 and 2016, so fewer 
precincts were dominated by one of them. 
 
Redistricting and local polarization: a hypothesis 
 
One potential contingent circumstance that could influence these findings, and especially the 
increased polarization at the precinct scale between 2008 and 2012, is the redrawing of precinct 
boundaries. After the 2010 census results were published most states were redistricted for both 
federal and state elections and with new Congressional and State Assembly Districts in place many 
precinct boundaries were probably redrawn so that they nested within those new larger territories 
(many of which were gerrymandered, notably by the Republican Party: McGann et al., 2016). A 
prime consideration in redrawing those boundaries would have been ensuring that the new 
precincts were of approximately equal size to facilitate electoral administration. In addition, 
however, in some places at least the redrawing of precinct boundaries may have been part of a local 
gerrymandering exercise, which could have been the cause of the increased polarization between 
2008 and 2012 – compared to the next four-year period when most District boundaries were 
unchanged. 
 
We have no information on the number of precincts that were unchanged between any pair 
of elections but do know the number of counties where there was no change in the total number of 
precincts. On the assumption that where there was no change in the number this implied no change 
in their boundaries (it could be, of course, that the boundaries were changed but the number of 
precincts was not), then there was no change between 2008 and 2012 in the number of precincts in 
47 per cent of counties. By contrast, there was no change in the number of precincts between 2012 
and 2016 in 69 per cent of the counties, providing clear if circumstantial evidence that precinct 
boundary changes may in many places have been associated with the decennial redistricting. 
 
As a check on whether the substantial volume of (assumed) redrawing of precinct 
boundaries, especially between 2008 and 2012, impacted on the intensity and direction of change in 
polarization, further analyses were undertaken for the two inter-election periods, 2008-2012 and 
2012-2016. For each pair, separate analyses were conducted for those counties which experienced 
no change in the number of precincts between the two dates and for those where was change.  
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The MOR values for the two sets of precincts at the relevant two dates, at each period, are 
in Figure 2; the CIs were too small to be separately identified. The MORs for the counties with no 
change in the number of precincts (the red dots) are smaller than those for the counties where there 
was a change (the blue dots) at each date and those differences are all statistically significant. Most 
importantly for the current argument, the increase between 2008 and 2012 for the latter date was 
much greater than that for the former group. In counties where the number of precincts changed 
during that period when most states were redistricted the MOR increased from 2.36 to 2.49 (a 
statistically significant 5 per cent increase) whereas in those counties where there was no change in 
the number of precincts the increase, again statistically significant, was smaller (from 1.95 to 2.01 – 
a 3 per cent increase). 
 
In the following inter-election period 2012-2016, post-redistricting in most states, there was 
a significant decline in the MOR for both groups of states (note that the counties in the two groups 
are not the same as those for the previous period), and it was greater in the counties where the 
number of precincts was changed. This may well be a consequence of the changing geography of 
support for the two parties’ candidates, with Trump capturing votes in precincts that formerly gave 
strong support to Obama and hence somewhat diminishing the degree of polarization overall as 
voters in some precincts were more evenly divided between the two candidates in 2016 than they 
had been between their predecessors in 2012. 
 
These analyses have not provided conclusive evidence that redistricting was the cause of 
greater polarization in some states than others as the result of the redrawing of precinct boundaries 
between 2008 and 2012, let alone that gerrymandering was involved in that redrawing in at least 
some places, because insufficient information is available to reach such a conclusion. There is 
circumstantial evidence supporting the case, however, suggesting an agenda for further research. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Strong evidence is being accumulated regarding the spatial polarization of the American electorate, 
as indicated by the geographical pattern of voting at presidential elections. Nationally, such evidence 
has been presented at relatively coarse spatial scales – division, state, and county. This strongly 
sustains the claim that more areas at all three of those scales are becoming dominated by those who 
voted for one of the two predominant parties. Divisions, states, and counties are more polarized in 
the first decades of the twenty-first than they were in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
 
Those findings, based on a rigorous statistical procedure developed within a multilevel 
modelling framework, sustain arguments regarding growing spatial polarization of the US electorate, 
but the scales for which they have been analysed do not include the local at which the sorting 
processes are assumed to operate. Increased polarization has to date only been identified in a small 
number of case studies of individual places using data at finer spatial scales. The national precinct-
level data assembled and analysed here allowed a first evaluation of the intensity of polarization at 
the last three presidential elections at a scale which approximates the locales wherein residential 
area choices are made. The data are not ideal for a full test of the polarization hypothesis as they do 
not cover sufficient elections with which to establish trends over a substantial period. Further, 
because precinct boundaries are redrawn – especially during periods of redistricting – they do not 
provide a consistent set of areas, thus precluding definitive conclusions regarding observed changes, 
which may reflect the consequence of those changed boundaries rather than any changes in 
residential choice patterns. Nevertheless, the data deployed here allow an enhanced appreciation of 
the intensity of fine-scale spatial polarization patterns at the national level, supplementing particular 
studies of individual places. 
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The clear conclusion to be drawn from these new analyses, additional to any drawn from 
previous studies, is that within the already-observed polarization of American voters at presidential 
elections at the county scale there is very substantial, statistically significant and greater polarization 
across the country’s electoral precincts. Holding constant the intensity of segregation at three larger 
scales, polarization according to the MOR measure was some 35 per cent greater at the precinct 
than at the county scale at both 2008 and 2012 elections, for example. Precinct-level polarization 
also increased significantly between those two elections, and circumstantial evidence suggests that 
this was largely the result of the redrawing of precinct boundaries that characterised most states 
after the 2010 census. Between 2012 and 2016 polarization at the precinct scale declined to its 2008 
level largely, it appears, because of Trump’s relative success in a number of places where the 
Democrats had previously performed well. In most counties the favoured party in 2012 won majority 
support again in 2016 (Johnston et al., 2017) but within some of them switches in support at the 
precinct scale between the Democratic and Republican party candidates meant that the intensity of 
polarization declined slightly, returning to its 2008 level overall. 
 
Two linked hypotheses – one relating to spatial pattern and the other to spatial process – 
have been promoted recently regarding the changing electoral geography of the United States, and 
evidence form an increasing number of tests has substantiated both. This paper has extended the 
findings regarding the pattern hypothesis at a spatial scale heretofore not analysed nationally, 
providing evidence of intense local polarization into locales consistent in size with the 
neighbourhoods that are the focus of the process hypothesis. 
 
Spatial polarization is only one element of the changing nature of the American electorate, 
and the links between those various elements – ideological, behavioral and geographical – have yet 
to be fully explored. The new empirical findings presented here with regard to the intensity, scope 
and scales of geographical polarization add to the research agenda. That recent polarization, 
according to Campbell, has been a ‘bottom-up’ and not a ‘top-down’ phenomenon: as he expressed 
it, ‘Polarization in the electorate begot polarization in the parties and polarization in the parties 
begot more polarization in the electorate (Campbell, 2016, 4). This process of structuration, 
although Campbell does not refer to it as such, thus has its origins in the communities and locales 
where people are politically socialised and mobilised, processes to which the parties have responded 
– by becoming more ideologically separate and distant from the median voter – and those responses 
have fed back into the local political milieu. Geography, as illustrated here, is a central feature of this 
ongoing polarization, therefore, and its role is part of the continuing agenda exploring its many 
parameters.  
 
References 
 
Abrams, S. J. and Fiorina, M. P. 2012. ““The Big Sort” That Wasn’t: a Sceptical Reexamination.” PS: 
Political Science & Politics, 45 (2): 203-210. 
 
Archer, J. C., Davidson, F. M., Fouberg, E. H., Martis, K. C., Shelley, F. M., Watrel, R. H. and Webster, 
G. R. (eds.) 2014. Atlas of the 2012 Elections. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Bishop, B. 2009. The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart. 
Boston: First Mariner Books. 
 
Browne, W. J. 2017. MCMC Estimation in MLwiN 3.0. Bristol: University of Bristol, Centre for 
Multilevel Modelling. Available at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/media/software/ 
mlwin/downloads/ manuals/3-00/mcmc-web.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). 
 
 10 
 
Browne, W. J., Subramaniam, S. V., Jones, K. and Goldstein, H. 2005. “Variance Partitioning in 
Multilevel Logistic Models that Exhibit Overdispersion.” Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 168 (1): 99-113. 
 
Brunn, S. D., Webster, G. R., Morrill, R. L., Shelley, F. M., Lavin, S. J. and Archer, J. C. (eds.) 2008. Atlas 
of the 2008 Elections. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Campbell, J. E. 2016. Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America. Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Carrington, W. J. and Troske, K. R. 1997. “On Measuring Segregation in Samples with Small Units.” 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 15 (4): 402-429. 
 
Cho, W. J., Tam, K., Gimpel, J. G. and Hui, I. S. 2013. “Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of 
the American Electorate.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103 (4): 856-
870. 
 
Cox, K. R. 1969. “The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context”, in C. Board, R. J. Chorley, P. Haggett and 
D. R. Stoddart, Progress in Geography 1. London: Edward Arnold, 81-118. 
 
Duncan, O. D., Cuzzort, R. P. and Duncan, B. (1961) Statistical geography: problems in analysing areal 
data. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
 
Fiorina, M. P. and Abrams, S. J. 2008. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” The Annual 
Review of Political Science, 11: 563-558. 
 
Gimpel, J. G. and Hui, I. S. 2015. “Seeking Politically Compatible Neighbors? The Role of 
Neighbourhood Partisan Composition in Residential Sorting.” Political Geography, 48 (1), 
130-142. 
 
Glaeser, E. L. and Ward, B. A. 2005. Myths and Realities of American Political Geography. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11857. Available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11857.pdf (accessed 12 January 2018). 
 
Hood, M. V. and McKee, S. C. 2010. “What Made Carolina Blue? In-Migration and the 2008 North 
Carolina Presidential Vote”. American Politics Research, 38 (2): 266-302. 
 
Johnston, R. J., Manley, D. and Jones, K. 2016. “Spatial Polarization of Presidential Voting in the 
United Sates, 1992-2012: the “Big Sort” Revisited.” Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers, 106 (5): 1047-1062. 
 
Johnston, R. J. and Pattie, C. J. 2006. Putting Voters in Their Place: Geography and Elections in Great 
Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Johnston, R. J. and Pattie, C. J. 2012. “Kevin Cox and Electoral Geography”. In A. E. G. Jonas and A. 
Wood (eds.) Territory, the State and Urban Politics: a Critical Appreciation of the Selected 
Writings of Kevin R. Cox. Farnham: Ashgate, 23-44. 
 
Johnston, R. J., Pattie, C. J., Jones, K. and Manley, D. 2017. “Was the 2016 United States’ Presidential 
Contest a Deviating Election? Continuity and Change in the Electoral Map – or ‘Plus ça 
 11 
 
change, plus ç’est la mème géographie’. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 27 
(4): 369-388. 
 
Jones, K. 1991. “Specifying and Estimating Multilevel Models for Geographical Research.” 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 16 (1): 148–159. 
 
Jones, K., Johnston, R. J., Manley, D., Owen, D. and Charlton, C. 2015. “Ethnic Residential 
Segregation: a Multi-Level, Multi-Group, Multi-Scale Approach – Exemplified by London, 
2011.” Demography, 52 (6): 1995-2019. 
 
Jones, K. and Subramanian, S. V. 2017. Developing Multilevel Models for Analysing Contextuality, 
Heterogeneity and Change using MLwiN 3.0, Volume 1. Bristol: University of Bristol. Centre 
for Multilevel Modelling, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
260771330_Developing_multilevel_models_for_analysing_contextuality_heterogeneity_and
_change_using_MLwiN_3_Volume_1_updated_March_2017_Volume_2_is_also_on_RGate 
(accessed 30 June 2017). 
 
Kinsella, C., McTague, C. and Raleigh, K. N. 2015. “Unmasking Geographical Polarization and 
Clustering: a Micro-Scalar Analysis of Partisan Voting Behaviour.” Applied Geography, 62 (3): 
404-419. 
 
Lang, C. and Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2015) Partisan Sorting in the United States: New Evidence from 
a Dynamic Analysis. Political Geography, 48 (1): 119-129. 
 
Larsen, K. and Merlo, J. 2005. “Appropriate Assessment of Neighborhood Effects on Individual 
Health: Integrating Random and Fixed Effects in Multilevel Logistic Regression.” American 
Journal of Epidemiology, 161 (1): 81-8 
 
Levendusky, M. 2009. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became 
Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
McGann, A. J., Smith, C. A., Latner, M. and Keena, A. 2016. Gerrymandering in America: the House of 
Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Popular Sovereignty. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
McKee, S. C. 2008. “Rural Voters and the Polarization of American Presidential Elections”. PS: 
Political Science and Politics, 41 (1): 101-108. 
 
Morrill, R. L., Knopp, L. and Brown, M. 2011. “Anomalies in Red and Blue II. Towards an 
Understanding of the Roles of Setting, Values and Demography in the 2004 and 2008 U.S. 
Presidential Elections”, Political Geography, 30 (3): 153-168. 
 
Morrill, R. L. and Webster, G. R. (2015) Spatial and Political Realignment of the U.S. Electorate, 1988-
2012. Political Geography, 48 (1): 93-107 
 
Myers, A. S. 2013. “Secular Geographical Polarization in the American South: the Case of Texas, 
1996-2010.” Electoral Studies, 32 (1): 48-62. 
 
Scala, D. J., Johnson, K. M. and Rogers, L. T. (2015) Red Rural, Blue Rural? Presidential Voting 
Patterns in a Changing Rural America. Political Geography, 48 (1): 108-118. 
 
 12 
 
Sussell, J. 2013 “New Support for the Big Sort Hypothesis: an Assessment of Partisan Geographic 
Sorting in California, 1992-2010.” PS: Political Science & Politics, 50 (4): 768-773. 
 
Watrel, R. H., Weichelt, R., Davidson, F. M., Heppen, J., Fouberg, E. H., Archer, J. C., Morrill, R. L., 
Shelley, F. M. and Martis, K. C. (eds.) 2018. Atlas of the 2016 Elections. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 
Table 1.  
The MOR values and their Credible Intervals (CIs) 
 
  2008   2012   2016 
 LowCI MOR HiCI LowCI MOR HiCI LowCI MOR HiCI 
Divisions 1.25 1.49 1.96 1.28 1.54 2.08 1.33 1.69 2.42 
States 1.29 1.41 1.55 1.34 1.46 1.61 1.36 1.47 1.62 
Counties 1.65 1.68 1.70 1.74 1.77 1.80 1.90 1.93 1.97 
Precincts 2.27 2.28 2.28 2.38 2.38 2.39 2.26 2.27 2.27 
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Figure 1.  
Three idealised exemplars of different forms of spatial polarization. 
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Figure 2. The MOR values at the precinct scale, with counties divided according to whether there 
was a change in the number of precincts there between the two elections.
 
